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Abstract
We study cost-sharing mechanisms for several fundamental NP-hard combinatorial optimization
problems. A cost-sharing mechanism is a protocol that, given bids for a service, determines which
bidders to serve and what prices to charge. The mechanism incurs a subset-dependent cost that is im-
plicitly defined by an instance of a combinatorial optimization problem. Three desirable but mutually
incompatible properties of a cost-sharing mechanism are: incentive-compatibility, meaning that play-
ers are motivated to bid their true private value for receiving the service; budget-balance, meaning that
the mechanism recovers its incurred cost with the prices charged; and efficiency, meaning that the cost
incurred and the valuations of the players served are traded off in an optimal way.
Our work is motivated by the following fundamental question: for which cost functions, and in
what senses, are incentive-compatible mechanisms with good approximate budget-balance and efficiency
possible? We make three different types of contributions to this question.
• We identify several new classes of combinatorial cost functions that admit incentive-compatible
mechanisms achieving both a constant-factor approximation of budget-balance and a polyloga-
rithmic approximation of the social cost formulation of efficiency. In particular, we exhibit such
mechanisms for the classes of facility location and single-sink rent-or-buy cost functions, with ap-
proximate efficiency O(log k) and O(log2 k), respectively. (Here k denotes the number of players
served in an efficient solution.) The mechanisms belong to the class of Moulin mechanisms, and
therefore satisfy a strong version of incentive-compatibility known as groupstrategyproofness.
• We prove a new, optimal lower bound of Ω(log2 k) on the approximate efficiency of every O(1)-
budget-balanced Moulin mechanism for Steiner tree or SSRoB cost functions. This lower bound
exposes a latent approximation hierarchy among different cost-sharing problems.
• We show that weakening the definition of incentive-compatibility to strategyproofness can per-
mit exponentially more efficient approximately budget-balanced mechanisms, in particular for set
cover cost-sharing problems.
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1 Introduction
Cost-Sharing Mechanisms. We study cost-sharing mechanisms for several fundamental NP-hard combi-
natorial optimization problems. A cost-sharing mechanism is a protocol that collects bids for a service from
potential users (players), chooses the subset of players to receive the service and a feasible way of servicing
them, and determines prices to charge the chosen players. The mechanism incurs a subset-dependent cost
C(S) that is given by a known cost function C . In this paper, we consider cost functions that are defined
implicitly by an instance of a combinatorial optimization problem.
Designing a cost-sharing mechanism requires picking and choosing between several desirable properties
that have long been known to be mutually incompatible. The most commonly considered such properties are:
(1) incentive-compatibility, meaning that players are motivated to bid their true private value vi for receiving
the service; budget-balance, meaning that the mechanism recovers its incurred cost with the prices charged;
and (3) efficiency, meaning that the cost incurred and the valuations of the players served are traded off in
an optimal way.
The properties (1)–(3) cannot be simultaneously achieved, even for very simple cost functions and weak
notions of incentive compatibility [5, 22]. This impossibility result motivated two distinct approaches to de-
signing cost-sharing mechanisms. The first approach ignores budget-balance and seeks incentive-compatible
and efficient cost-sharing mechanisms. The VCG mechanism (see e.g. [18, 20]) is the most flexible and
well-known mechanism of this type. These mechanisms are typically strategyproof (SP), in the sense that
the utility of each player—its value vi minus the price it is charged, or 0 if it does not receive the service—is
maximized by bidding truthfully for every fixed set of bids by the other players. They are typically not
approximately budget-balanced for any reasonable approximation factor (see e.g. [3]).
The second design approach to cost-sharing mechanisms is to insist on incentive-compatibility and
budget-balance, while regarding efficiency as a secondary objective. Moulin [19] introduced a class of
mechanisms of this type, which have good budget-balance and are incentive compatible. In fact, Moulin
mechanisms are groupstrategyproof (GSP), meaning that an analogue of the SP condition holds even for
coordinated bidding by coalitions of players. Researchers have developed approximately budget-balanced
Moulin mechanisms for a number of different combinatorial optimization problems, including fixed-tree
multicast [1, 3, 4]; the more general submodular cost-sharing problem [19, 20]; Steiner tree [11, 12, 14];
Steiner forest [15, 16]; facility location [17, 21]; rent-or-buy network design [9, 21], and various covering
problems [2, 10]. Almost all known GSP cost-sharing mechanisms are Moulin mechanisms (see [10]).
Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms. By design, budget-balance takes explicit prece-
dence over efficiency in Moulin mechanisms. Indeed, nearly all previous papers that design Moulin mecha-
nisms do not address the efficiency of the proposed mechanisms. Nevertheless, very recent work [23] shows
that many Moulin mechanisms possess approximately optimal efficiency. The first evidence that Moulin
mechanisms can have good efficiency properties was provided earlier by Moulin and Shenker [20], who
gave a bound on the worst-case additive efficiency loss of a particular Moulin mechanism for submodular
cost functions.
Several definitions of approximate efficiency are possible, and the choice of definition is important for
quantifying the inefficiency of Moulin mechanisms. The most common formulation of (exact) efficiency is
to require that a cost-sharing mechanism choose a subset of players that maximizes the social welfare, where
the social welfare W (S) of a set S is defined as
∑
i∈S vi−C(S). Feigenbaum et al. [3] showed that, even for
extremely simple cost functions, for every pair of constants α, β ≥ 1, no β-budget balanced SP mechanism
always recovers an α fraction of the maximum social welfare. (A mechanism is β-budget-balanced if the
sum of prices charged is always at most the cost incurred and at least a β fraction of this cost.)
An alternative formulation of exact efficiency is to choose a subset minimizing the social cost, where
we define the social cost π(S) of a set S as the sum of the incurred service cost and the excluded valuations:
1
C(S) +
∑
i/∈S vi. Since π(S) = −W (S) +
∑
i∈U vi for every set S, where U denotes the set of all players,
a subset maximizes the social welfare if and only if it minimizes the social cost. In previous work [23], the
authors showed that well-known, approximately budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms for submodular cost-
sharing [20] and Steiner tree cost-sharing problems [11] always achieve a polylogarithmic (multiplicative)
approximation of the optimal social cost. If a cost-sharing mechanism is an α-approximation algorithm with
respect to the social cost objective, then we say that the mechanism is α-approximate.
The results in [23] raise the possibility of obtaining incentive-compatible mechanisms that simultane-
ously approximate budget-balance and efficiency for a wide array of important cost-sharing problems. At
the highest level, this paper is motivated by the following fundamental question:
for which cost functions, and in what senses, are incentive-compatible mechanisms with good approx-
imate budget-balance and efficiency possible?
More precisely, our work addresses the following issues.
(1) Which cost functions admit a Moulin mechanism that is α-approximate for a reasonable (say, poly-
logarithmic) factor α? A necessary condition for this is that the cost function admit a so-called cross-
monotonic cost-sharing method with good budget-balance [19, 23]; many but not all combinatorial
cost-sharing problems admit such methods [10]. Is this condition also sufficient, or are there further
obstructions to the design of approximately efficient Moulin mechanisms?
(2) Do combinatorial cost-sharing problems exhibit a natural “approximation hierarchy”? Do the twin re-
quirements of incentive-compatibility and good budget-balance force quantitatively different amounts
of efficiency loss in different combinatorial optimization problems?
(3) Several natural cost-sharing problems do not even admit Moulin mechanisms with good budget-
balance [10]. Does weakening the incentive-compatibility constraint (from GSP to SP, say) permit
approximately efficient and budget-balanced mechanisms for such problems?
Our Results. We make three different types of contributions on approximately efficient cost-sharing
mechanisms.
First, we identify several new classes of combinatorial cost functions that admit O(polylog(k))-approx-
imate Moulin mechanisms, where k is the number of players served in an optimal solution. Previously, only
submodular cost functions and Steiner tree cost functions were known to admit such mechanisms [23].
Such mechanisms can only exist for cost functions that admit O(polylog(k))-budget-balanced cross-
monotonic cost-sharing methods [19, 23]. Our results nearly exhaust the combinatorial optimization prob-
lems for which such methods are known, leaving only the class of Steiner forest cost-sharing problems [15]
unresolved.
In particular, for facility location cost-sharing problems, we show that the Moulin mechanism based
on the O(1)-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing method of Pa´l and Tardos [21] is O(log k)-
approximate. Our proof uses, as a black box, a result in [23] that reduces upper bounding the approximate
efficiency of a Moulin mechanism to the “summability” of its underlying cost-sharing method (see Def-
inition 2.3). The essence of this result is therefore our (problem-specific) argument that the Pa´l-Tardos
cost-sharing method is O(log k)-summable. A simple example shows that every O(1)-budget-balanced
Moulin mechanism for facility location problems is Ω(log k)-approximate.
We also prove a bound of O(log2 k) on the summability of the O(1)-budget-balanced cross-monotonic
cost-sharing method for single-sink rent-or-buy (SSRoB) cost functions due to Gupta, Srinivasan, and Tar-
dos [9] and Leonardi and Scha¨fer [17]. The main result in [23] then implies that the corresponding Moulin
mechanism is O(log2 k)-approximate.
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Second, we prove a new lower bound that exposes a non-trivial, latent hierarchy among different cost-
sharing problems. Specifically, we prove that every O(1)-budget-balanced Moulin mechanism for Steiner
tree cost functions is Ω(log2 k)-approximate. This lower bound trivially also applies to SSRoB cost func-
tions. A lower bound of Ω(log2 k) was previously known only for specific Steiner tree Moulin mecha-
nisms [11, 23].
This lower bound establishes a previously unobservable separation between submodular and facility
location cost-sharing problems on the one hand, and Steiner tree and SSRoB cost-sharing problems on the
other. All four of these classes of cost functions admit O(1)-budget-balanced, cross-monotonic cost-sharing
methods. However, the first two problems admit Θ(log k)-approximate Moulin mechanisms, while the latter
two only allow Θ(log2 k)-approximate Moulin mechanisms.
All previous lower bounds on the efficiency of Moulin mechanisms arose as a consequence of either
budget-balance lower bounds or, in the case of the combinatorial optimization problems considered in this
paper, from a trivial example equivalent to a single-link instance of fixed-tree multicast [23]. This type
of example cannot be used to prove a lower bound larger than the kth Harmonic number Hk = Θ(log k)
on the approximate efficiency of a Moulin mechanism. We obtain the stronger bound of Ω(log2 k) by a
significantly more intricate construction that is specific to Steiner tree cost functions.
Third, we show that weakening the definition of incentive-compatibility can permit exponentially more
efficient mechanisms for basic cost-sharing problems. For set cover cost-sharing problems, results of Im-
morlica, Mahdian, and Mirrokni [10] imply that every Moulin mechanism is Ω(
√
k)-budget-balanced and
hence Ω(
√
k)-approximate [23]. Recall that essentially all known GSP mechanisms are Moulin mechanisms
(see [10]). On the other hand, we show that the set cover mechanism of Devanur, Mihail, and Vazirani [2],
which is SP and O(log k)-budget-balanced but not GSP, is O(log k)-approximate. We also show a similar,
if less dramatic, result for facility location problems: SP mechanisms can obtain approximation factors that
are unachievable with Moulin mechanisms.
2 Preliminaries
Cost-Sharing Mechanisms. We consider a cost function C that assigns a cost C(S) to every subset S
of a universe U of players. We will always assume that C is nonnegative and nondecreasing (i.e., S ⊆ T
implies C(S) ≤ C(T )). We sometimes refer to C(S) as the service cost, to distinguish it from the social
cost (defined below). We also assume that every player i ∈ U has a private, nonnegative valuation vi.
A (direct revelation) mechanism collects a nonnegative bid bi from each player i ∈ U , selects a set
S ⊆ U of players, and charges every player i a price pi. We interpret the valuation vi as player i’s willingness
to pay to be included in the chosen set S, and a mechanism typically uses the (known) bid bi as a proxy for
the (unknown) valuation vi. We will only allow mechanisms that are “individually rational” in the sense that
pi = 0 for players i /∈ S and pi ≤ bi for players i ∈ S. We also require that all prices are nonnegative (“no
positive transfers”). As is standard, we assume that players have quasilinear utilities, meaning that each
player i aims to maximize ui(S, pi) = vixi − pi, where xi = 1 if i ∈ S and xi = 0 if i /∈ S.
Our first definition states that a mechanism should be designed to motivate players to bid truthfully (i.e.,
to set bi = vi for all i). We will use the strong and well-known such definition of a groupstrategyproof (GSP)
mechanism, which formalizes the idea of a “collusion-resistant” mechanism. The definition states that every
coordinated set of false bids by a coalition should decrease the utility of some player in the coalition (or
should have no effect).
Definition 2.1 A mechanism is groupstrategyproof (GSP) if the following property holds for every input
(U,C, v). Let T ⊆ U be a coalition of players. Let b and b′ be two bid vectors (indexed by U ) for which
bi = b
′
i for all players i /∈ T outside the coalition. Assume that players of T bid truthfully in b (bi = vi
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for all i ∈ T ). Let (S, p) and (S′, p′) be the mechanism outcomes given bids b and b′, respectively. If
ui(S
′, p′) > ui(S, p) for some player i ∈ T , then uj(S′, p′) < uj(S, p) for some other player j ∈ T .
A strategyproof (SP) mechanism is only required to satisfy the constraint in Definition 2.1 for coalitions T
that are singletons.
There is a well-known tension between the goals of budget-balance and efficiency in cost-sharing mech-
anisms. For a parameter β ≥ 1, a mechanism is β-budget balanced if for every possible outcome (S, p)
of the mechanism, it recovers at least a 1/β fraction of the service cost, with the constraint that the total
cost-recovery does not exceed the service cost: C(S)/β ≤∑i∈S pi ≤ C(S).
We measure efficiency using the objective of social cost minimization. Given a universe U of players
with valuations v and a cost function C , the social cost of a set S ⊆ U is defined by π(S) = C(S) +∑
i/∈S vi. We say that a cost-sharing mechanism is efficient if, assuming truthful bids, it always outputs a set
S that minimizes the social cost. Equivalently, an efficient mechanism always maximizes the social welfare
W (S) =
∑
i∈S vi − C(S). Finally, a cost-sharing mechanism is α-approximate if, assuming truthful bids,
it always outputs a set S with social cost at most an α factor times the optimal social cost.
For example, the VCG mechanism is efficient, is not β-budget-balanced for any finite factor β ≥ 1, and
is SP but not GSP (see e.g. [18, 20]). Below we review a class of mechanisms that are GSP and, for many
cost functions, both approximately budget-balanced and approximately efficient.
In this paper, we focus on cost functions that are defined implicitly as the optimal solution of an instance
of a (NP-hard) combinatorial optimization problem. Besides selecting the set of players to be served, the
mechanism must also decide how to service this set, ideally in polynomial time. For instance, for set cover
cost functions (Section 5), the cost C(S) of serving a set S of players is defined as the minimum cost of
a collection of sets that covers all of S. The (polynomial-time) mechanism that we consider uses a greedy
algorithm to construct a feasible (not necessarily optimal) cover of the chosen players. In such cases, we
write C ′(S) for the service cost incurred by the mechanism, reserving C(S) for the cost of the optimal way
of providing service to the set S. A mechanism is now defined to be α-approximate only if it always chooses
a set S and incurs a service cost C ′(S) such that C ′(S) +
∑
i/∈S vi is at most α times the optimal social
cost minS∗⊆U [C(S∗) +
∑
i/∈S∗ vi]. Similarly, a mechanism is β-budget-balanced only if it always recovers
at least a β fraction of the incurred cost C ′(S) while recovering no more than the cost C(S) of optimally
serving the set S.
Moulin Mechanisms and Cross-Monotonic Cost-Sharing Methods. Next we review a class of cost-
sharing mechanisms called Moulin mechanisms. Almost all known GSP cost-sharing mechanisms are
Moulin mechanisms; see [10, 19, 20] for detailed discussions on the relationship between Moulin mech-
anisms and general GSP cost-sharing mechanisms.
Given a universe U of players and a cost function C , a cost-sharing method χ assigns a non-negative
cost share χ(i, S) for every subset S ⊆ U of players and every player i ∈ S. (Note players no longer have
valuations.) A cost-sharing method is β-budget balanced for C for a parameter β ≥ 1 if it always recovers
at least β fraction of the cost, without recovering more than the cost: C(S)/β ≤ ∑i∈S χ(i, S) ≤ C(S).
A cost-sharing method is cross-monotonic if adding players to the set S only decreases the cost shares of
players: for all S ⊆ T ⊆ U and i ∈ S, χ(i, S) ≥ χ(i, T ).
A cost-sharing method χ for C gives rise the following Moulin mechanism Mχ for C . First, collect a
bid bi for each player i. Initialize the set S to all of U and set a price pi equal to χ(i, S) for each player i.
If pi ≤ bi for all i ∈ S, halt and output the set S (and charge prices p). If pi > bi for some player i, then
remove an arbitrary such player from the set S and iterate. Moulin [19] proved the following.
Theorem 2.2 ([19]) If χ is a cross-monotonic cost-sharing method for the cost function C , then the cor-
responding Moulin mechanism Mχ is groupstrategyproof. Moreover, if χ is β-budget-balanced, then so
is Mχ.
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A cost-sharing method χ is said to be in the core if every subset S′ of players pays at most the cost
C(S′) of optimally serving them alone: for all sets S ⊆ U and for all S′ ⊆ S, ∑i∈S′ χ(i, S) ≤ C(S′).
The core condition is a natural fairness condition and has been extensively studied. It also turns out to be
useful in proving upper bounds on the approximate efficiency of a mechanism. It is easy to see that every
approximately budget-balanced and cross-monotonic cost-sharing method is in the core. The non-Moulin
mechanisms that we study in Section 5 will also charge prices that satisfy the core condition.
Summability and Approximate Efficiency. The approximate efficiency of Moulin mechanisms was pre-
viously studied in [23]. The main result in [23] shows that the approximate efficiency of a Moulin mech-
anism is completely controlled by the budget-balance and one additional parameter of the underlying cost-
sharing method. We define this parameter next.
Definition 2.3 ([23]) Let C and χ be a cost function and a cost-sharing method, respectively, defined on a
common universe U of players. The method χ is α-summable for C if
|S|∑
ℓ=1
χ(iℓ, Sℓ) ≤ α · C(S) (1)
for every ordering σ of U and every set S ⊆ U , where Sℓ and iℓ denote the set of the first ℓ players of S and
the ℓth player of S (with respect to σ), respectively.
The main result in [23] is as follows.
Theorem 2.4 ([23]) Let U be a universe of players and C a nondecreasing cost function on U with C(∅) =
0. Let M be a Moulin mechanism for C with underlying cost-sharing method χ. Let α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 1
be the smallest numbers such that χ is α-summable and β-budget-balanced. Then the mechanism M is
(α+ β)-approximate and no better than max{α, β}-approximate.
Note that the upper and lower bounds in Theorem 2.4 differ by at most a factor of 2. In particular, an
O(1)-budget-balanced Moulin mechanism is Θ(α)-approximate if and only if the underlying cost-sharing
method is Θ(α)-summable. Strictly speaking, the lower bound of α in Theorem 2.4 requires that the cost-
sharing method χ satisfy at least one of several possible weak technical conditions, such as the notion of
“strong consumer sovereignty” studied (in somewhat different forms) in [10, 20]. Since we will only use
this characterization in situations where these technical conditions hold, we defer further discussion of this
issue to the full version.
3 Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Facility Location
and Single-Sink Rent-or-Buy
3.1 A Θ(log k)-Approximate Mechanism for Facility Location
In this subsection we consider facility location cost-sharing problems. The input is given by a set U of
demands (the players), a set F of facilities, an opening cost fq for each facility q ∈ F , and a metric c
defined on U ∪ F . The cost C(S) of a subset S ⊆ U of players is then defined as the cost of an optimal
solution to the uncapacitated facility location problem induced by S. In other words,
C(S) = min
∅6=F ∗⊆F

∑
q∈F ∗
fq +
∑
i∈S
min
q∈F ∗
c(q, i)

 .
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We seek a cross-monotonic, approximately budget-balanced cost-sharing method for such problems that
also has good summability. We begin with a simple lower bound, similar to that given in [23] for submodular
cost-sharing problems.
Proposition 3.1 For every k ≥ 1, there is a k-player facility location cost function C with the following
property: for every β ≥ 1 and every β-budget-balanced, cross-monotone cost-sharing method χ for C , χ is
no better than Hk/β-summable.
The proof of Proposition 3.1, and all other proofs of this paper, are deferred to the Appendix.
Applying the characterization in Theorem 2.4 yields a lower bound on the approximate efficiency of all
Moulin mechanisms for facility location cost-sharing problems.
Corollary 3.2 For every k ≥ 1, there is a k-player facility location cost function C with the following
property: for every β ≥ 1 and every β-budget-balanced Moulin mechanism M for C , M is no better than
Hk/β-approximate.
Pa´l and Tardos [21] showed the every facility location cost function admits a 3-budget-balanced cross-
monotonic cost-sharing method χPT . (We review this method in the proof of Lemma 3.5 in the Appendix.)
Our first main result shows that the corresponding Moulin mechanism matches the lower bound in Corol-
lary 3.2, up to a constant factor.
Theorem 3.3 Let C be a k-player facility location cost function and χPT the corresponding Pa´l-Tardos
cost-sharing method. Then χPT is Hk-summable for C .
Applying Theorem 2.4 yields an efficiency guarantee for the corresponding Moulin mechanisms.
Corollary 3.4 Let C be a k-player facility location cost function and MPT the Moulin mechanism based on
the corresponding Pa´l-Tardos cost-sharing method. Then MPT is GSP, 3-budget-balanced, and (Hk + 3)-
approximate.
Theorem 3.3 will follow immediately from two lemmas. The first, and arguably more surprising, lemma
states that single-facility instances supply worst-case examples for the summability of the PT cost-sharing
scheme.
Lemma 3.5 For every k ≥ 1, the summability of PT cost-sharing methods for k-player facility location
cost functions is maximized by the cost functions that correspond to single-facility instances.
Lemma 3.5 is based on a monotonicity property that we prove for the PT cost-sharing method: increasing
the distance between a demand and a facility can only increase cost shares. While intuitive and easy to
prove, analogous monotonicity properties fail for other cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods, such as the
JV Steiner tree method [11].
Informally, this monotonicity property allows us to argue that in worst-case facility location instances,
players are partitioned into non-interacting groups, each clustered around one facility. We complete the
proof by arguing that the summability of the PT cost-sharing method for one of these single-facility clusters
in at least that in the original facility location instance.
Our second lemma bounds the summability of PT cost-sharing methods in single-facility instances.
Lemma 3.6 Let C be a k-player facility location cost function corresponding to a single-facility instance.
If χPT is the corresponding PT cost-sharing method, then χPT is Hk-summable for C .
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Lemma 3.6 is easy to prove in the special case where all players are equidistant from the single facility.
The case where different players can have different distances from the facility does not easily reduce to the
uniform case, since changing the distances to be “more uniform” can decrease the summability of PT cost
shares. For this reason, we instead prove Lemma 3.6 directly via a charging argument.
3.2 An O(log2 k)-Approximate Mechanism for Single-Sink Rent-or-Buy
Next we consider single-sink rent-or-buy (SSRoB) cost-sharing problems. The input is given by a graph
G = (V,E) with edge costs that satisfy the Triangle Inequality, a root vertex t, a set U of demands (the
players), each of which is located at a vertex of G, and a parameter M ≥ 1. A feasible solution to the
SSRoB problem induced by S is a way of installing sufficient capacity on the edges of G so that every
player in S can simultaneously route one unit of flow to t. Installing x units of capacity on an edge e
costs ce ·min{x,M}; the parameter M can be interpreted as the ratio between the cost of “buying” infinite
capacity for a flat fee and the cost of “renting” a single unit of capacity. The cost C(S) of a subset S ⊆ U
of players is then defined as the cost of an optimal solution to the SSRoB problem induced by S.
When M = 1, the SSRoB problem is equivalent to the Steiner tree problem. Theorem 4.2 in Section 4
thus implies that every O(1)-budget-balanced Moulin mechanism for k-player SSRoB cost-sharing prob-
lems is Ω(log2 k)-approximate. Our next main result is a matching upper bound for the Moulin mechanism
based on a cost-sharing method (“GST cost shares”) discovered independently by Gupta, Srinivasan, and
Tardos [9] and Leonardi and Scha¨fer [17].
Theorem 3.7 Let C be a k-player SSRoB cost function and χGST the corresponding GST cost-sharing
method. Then χGST is O(log2 k)-summable for C .
Since GST cost shares areO(1)-budget-balanced and cross-monotonic [9, 17], Theorems 2.4 and 3.7 implies
that the corresponding Moulin mechanism is O(log2 k)-approximate.
Remark 3.8 GST cost shares are defined as expectations of quantities that arise in a randomized algorithm.
Unfortunately, it is not clear how to compute these cost shares in polynomial time. Gupta, Srinivasan,
and Tardos [9] derandomized this algorithm and showed how to compute O(1)-budget balanced, cross-
monotonic cost shares for the SSRoB problem in polynomial time. We expect that Theorem 3.7 will also
hold for these cost shares, but have not yet verified this.
Remark 3.9 In this section we focused on facility location and SSRoB cost functions, but our techniques
also apply to additional problems such as connected facility location [17] and edge cover [10]. Among the
combinatorial optimization problems known to admit cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods with reason-
able budget-balance, approximately efficient Moulin mechanisms are now known for all of them except for
the Steiner forest problem [15].
4 An Ω(log2 k) Lower Bound for the Steiner Tree Problem
An instance of the Steiner tree cost-sharing problem [11] is given by an undirected graph G = (V,E) with
a root vertex t and nonnegative edge costs, with each player of U located at some vertex of G. For a subset
S ⊆ U , the cost C(S) is defined as that of a minimum-cost subgraph of G that spans all of the players of S
as well as the root t. The following theorem is established in [23].
Theorem 4.1 ([23]) The JV Steiner tree mechanism is 2-budget-balanced and O(log2 k)-approximate.
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A matching lower bound for the JV mechanism was also shown in [23]. The main result of this section is a
matching lower bound for every Moulin mechanism.
Theorem 4.2 There is a constant c > 0 such that the following statement holds. For every β ≥ 1, every
β-budget-balanced Moulin mechanism M for Steiner tree cost-sharing problems, and every k ≥ 2, there is
a Steiner tree cost function C defined on a universe U and a subset S ⊆ U such that |S| = k and the output
of M has social cost at least (c log2 k/β) · C(S).
In short, O(1)-budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms for Steiner tree cost-sharing problems must be Ω(log2 k)-
approximate. This lower bound also applies to the more general SSRoB cost-sharing problems, which
proves that the Moulin mechanism of Subsection 3.2 achieves the minimum-possible worst-case efficiency
loss (up to a constant factor). In light of Corollary 3.4 and the proof in [23] that the Shapley mechanism is
Hk-approximate for submodular cost-sharing problems, Theorem 4.2 implies that Steiner tree and SSRoB
cost-sharing problems are fundamentally more difficult for Moulin mechanisms than facility location and
submodular cost-sharing problems.
We now outline the proof of Theorem 4.2. At the highest level, our goal is to exhibit a (large) network
G such that every O(1)-budget-balanced Steiner tree Moulin mechanism behaves like the JV mechanism on
some subnetwork of G.
Fix values for the parameters k ≥ 2 and β ≥ 1. We construct a sequence of networks, culminating in G.
The network G0 consists of a set V0 of two nodes, one of which is the root t, which are connected by an edge
of cost 1. The player set U0 is
√
k players that are co-located at the non-root node. (Assume for simplicity
that k is a power of 4.) For i > 0, we obtain the network Gj from Gj−1 by replacing each edge (v,w) of
Gj−1 with m internally disjoint two-hop paths between v and w, where m is a sufficiently large function of
k of β. (We will choose m ≥ 8β√k · (2β)
√
k
.) See Figure 1 in Appendix A. The cost of each of these 2m
edges is half of the cost of the edge (v,w). Thus every edge in Gj has cost 2−j .
Let Vj denote the vertices of Gj that are not also present in Gj−1. We augment the universe by placing√
k new co-located players at each vertex of Vj; denote these new players by Uj . The final network G is
then Gp, where p = (log k)/2. Let V = V0 ∪ · · · ∪ Vp and U = U0 ∪ · · · ∪ Up denote the corresponding
vertex and player sets. Let C denote the corresponding Steiner tree cost function.
Now fix β ≥ 1 and an arbitrary cross-monotonic, β-budget balanced Steiner tree cost-sharing method
χ. By Theorem 2.4, we can prove Theorem 4.2 by exhibiting a subset S ⊆ U of size k and an ordering σ of
the players of S such that
∑k
ℓ=1 χ(iℓ, Sℓ) ≥ (c log2 k/β) · C(S), where iℓ and Sℓ denote the ℓth player and
the first ℓ players with respect to σ.
We construct the set S iteratively. For j = 0, 1, . . . , p, we will identify a subset Sj ⊆ Uj of players; the
set S will then be S0 ∪ · · · ∪Sp. Recall that Uj consists of groups of
√
k players, each co-located at a vertex
of Vj , with m such groups for each edge of Gj−1. The set Sj will consist of zero or one such group of
√
k
players for each edge of Gj−1.
The set S0 is defined to be U0. For j > 0, suppose that we have already defined S0, . . . , Sj−1. Call a
vertex v ∈ V0 ∪ · · · ∪ Vj−1 active if v is the root t or if the
√
k players co-located at v were included in
the set S0 ∪ · · · ∪ Sj−1, Call an edge (v,w) of Gj−1 active if both of its endpoints are active and inactive
otherwise.
To define Sj , we consider each edge (v,w) of Gj−1 in an arbitrary order. Each such edge gives rise to
m groups of
√
k co-located players in Gj . If (v,w) in inactive in Gj−1, then none of these m
√
k players
are included in Sj . If (v,w) is active in Gj−1, then we will choose precisely one of the m groups of players,
and will include these
√
k co-located players in Sj . We first state two lemmas that hold independently of
how this choice is made; we then elaborate on our criteria for choosing groups of players.
Lemma 4.3 For every j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , p, |Sj| = 2j−1
√
k. Also, |S0| =
√
k.
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Lemma 4.3 implies that |S| = √k(1+∑p−1j=0 2j) = k. The next lemma states that our construction maintains
the invariant that the players selected in the first j iterations lie “on a straight line” in G.
Lemma 4.4 For every j ∈ 0, 1, . . . , p, C(S0 ∪ · · · ∪ Sj) = 1.
In particular, Lemma 4.4 implies that C(S) = 1. Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 both follow from straightforward
inductions on j.
We now explain how to choose one out of the m groups of co-located players that arise from an active
edge. Fix an iteration j > 0 and let Sˆ denote the set of players selected in previous iterations (S0, . . . , Sj−1)
and previously in the current iteration. Let (v,w) be the active edge of Gj−1 under consideration and
A1, . . . , Am ⊆ Uj the corresponding groups of co-located players. We call the group Ar good if the
√
k
players of Ar can be ordered i1, i2, . . . , i√k so that
χ(iℓ, Sˆ ∪ {i1, . . . , iℓ}) ≥ 1
4β
· 2
−j
ℓ
(2)
for every ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,√k}. We then include an arbitrary good group Ar in the set Sj .
The success of this approach crucially depends on the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5 Provided m is a sufficiently large function of k and β, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, every ordering
of the active edges of Gj−1, and every edge (v,w) in this ordering, at least one of the m groups of players
of Uj that corresponds to (v,w) is good. Also, the group S0 is good.
We prove Lemma 4.5 in Appendix C. We conclude by using the lemma to finish the proof of Theorem 4.2.
We have already defined the subset S ⊆ U of players. We define the ordering σ of the players in S as
follows. First, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, all players of Sj−1 precede all players of Sj in σ. Second, for each
j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, the players of Sj are ordered according to groups, with the
√
k players of a group appearing
consecutively in σ. The ordering of the different groups of players of Sj is the same as the corresponding
ordering of the active edges of Gj−1 that was used to define these groups. Third, each group of
√
k co-
located players is ordered so that (2) holds. This is possible by the definition of a good group and because
all groups of players within S are good (Lemma 4.5).
Now consider the sum
∑k
ℓ=1 χ(iℓ, Sℓ), where iℓ and Sℓ denote the ℓth player and the first ℓ players of S
with respect to σ, respectively. Since (2) holds for every group of players, for every j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p}, every
group of players in Sj contributes at least
√
k∑
ℓ=1
1
4β
· 2
−j
ℓ
=
2−jH√k
4β
to this sum. By Lemma 4.3, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, there are 2j−1 such groups. There is also the group
S0. Thus the sum
∑k
ℓ=1 χ(iℓ, Sℓ) is at least
H√k
4β

1 +
(log k)/2∑
j=1
2j−1 · 2−j

 ≥ c
β
log2 k =
(
c
β
log2 k
)
· C(S)
for some constant c > 0 that is independent of k and β. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
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5 Beyond Groupstrategyproof Mechanisms
In this section we show that relaxing the constraint of groupstrategyproofness permits fundamentally bet-
ter simultaneous approximation of budget-balance and efficiency. We begin with a particularly dramatic
example: set cover cost-sharing problems. While every Moulin mechanism has extremely poor (inverse
polynomial) budget-balance and efficiency, we show that a strategyproof mechanism due to Devanur, Mi-
hail, and Vazirani [2] achieves a logarithmic approximation of both objective functions. We also show that
a second strategyproof mechanism in [2] is both 1.861-budget-balanced and O(log k)-approximate; this
matches the efficiency bound of the Pa´l-Tardos mechanism (Theorem 3.3) while the lower bound of 3 that
applies to all Moulin mechanisms for the problem [10].
Efficiency of the DMV Set-Cover Mechanism. In this subsection we consider Set Cover cost-sharing
function. Such a function is defined implicitly by a universe U of players and a collection C of subsets of U ,
each of which has a given nonnegative cost. The cost C(S) of a subset S ⊆ U is then defined as the cost of
minimum-cost subcollection of C whose union covers all players of S.
Immorlica, Mahdian, and Mirrokni [10] showed that every Moulin mechanism for Set Cover prob-
lems is Ω(
√
k)-budget-balanced. By Theorem 2.4, every such mechanism is also Ω(
√
k)-approximate. We
next consider the strategyproof mechanism proposed by Devanur, Mihail and Vazirani [2] for Set Cover
cost-sharing problems (the DMV mechanism), and show that it achieves a far superior (logarithmic) approx-
imation of both objectives.
We now briefly review the DMV mechanism, which is based on the classical greedy algorithm for Set
Cover and bears some resemblance to Moulin mechanisms. Initially, bids are collected from the players.
After initializing a set S to be U , the following steps are repeated until all of the players of S have been
marked. (All players are initially unmarked.) Every iteration, we choose a set Sj ∈ C that minimizes the
ratio of the cost cj the set and the number mj of unmarked players of S that it covers. We then try to charge
each unmarked player Sj ∩ S a common cost share of cj/mj · Hk. If the bids of all unmarked players in
Sj ∩S are at least this amount, then all of these players are marked and the set Sj is included in our final set
cover solution. Otherwise, all of these players are deleted from the set S.
Devanur, Mihail, and Vazirani [2] proved the following: For every k-player set cover cost-sharing prob-
lem, the DMV mechanism is strategyproof and Hk-budget balanced. In addition, the DMV mechanism
assigns cost shares that lie in the core, and is weakly groupstrategyproof in the following sense: no coalition
can bid in way that strictly improves the utility of all of the deviating players [2].
We show that in addition to satisfying these properties, the mechanism is O(log k)-approximate.
Theorem 5.1 For every k-player Set Cover cost-sharing problem, the DMV mechanism is (Hk+1)-approximate.
The theorem follows immediately from two lemmas, each of which bounds a term of the social cost of
the allocation constructed by DMV. The first lemma shows that the allocation returned by the DMV set cover
mechanism is bounded above by Hk times the social cost of the optimal allocation. The proof of this lemma
follows from three facts. First, the cost shares of the selected players pay for at least a 1/Hk fraction of the
cost of the constructed solution. Second, the cost shares assigned by the DMV mechanism are in the core.
Third, players who are allocated service by the DMV mechanism pay at most their valuations. The second
lemma upper bounds the total valuation of the players that are deleted by the DMV mechanism but included
in the optimal solution. In the iteration during which such a player is deleted, the cost shares offered to it
must exceed its valuation. By leveraging the greedy nature of the mechanism, these cost shares can then be
charged to the cost of the optimal allocation.
Theorem 5.1 also applies to the special case of Vertex Cover cost-sharing problems; even for this special
case, every Moulin mechanism is Ω(k1/3)-budget-balanced [10] and therefore (by Theorem 2.4) Ω(k1/3)-
approximate.
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Efficiency of the DMV Facility Location Mechanism. In this subsection, we give a second example of
how relaxing the GSP constraint permits mechanisms with better approximation factors. Theorem 3.3 shows
that the Moulin mechanism based on the Pa´l-Tardos cost-sharing scheme [21] is 3-budget-balanced and
O(log k)-approximate for facility location cost-sharing problems. Immorlica, Mahdian, and Mirrokni [10]
showed that no such Moulin mechanism has better budget-balance, no matter how poor its approximate
efficiency. We next show that the weakly groupstrategyproof mechanism proposed by Devanur, Mihail, and
Vazirani [2] for facility location problems has better budget-balance and comparable approximate efficiency.
As in their Set Cover mechanism, the DMV mechanism for facility location cost-sharing problems is
based on a greedy algorithm. We defer the details of the mechanism to Appendix D.2. Devanur, Mihail,
and Vazirani [2] proved the following: For every k-player facility location cost-sharing problem, the DMV
mechanism is weakly groupstrategyproof and 1.861-budget balanced. In addition, the DMV mechanism
assigns cost shares that lie in the core.
We prove that the DMV mechanism is also O(log k)-approximate.
Theorem 5.2 For every k-player facility location cost-sharing problem, the DMV mechanism is (Hk/1.861+
1.861)-approximate.
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root t
Figure 1: The figure shows an intermediate stage in the graph construction process for m = 3. This value
of m is chosen only for convenience of depiction. The above graph, G2, is obtained after two iterations of
the construction process. All the edges have length 14 .
A Figures
B Missing Proofs from Section 3
B.1 Missing Proofs from Subsection 3.1
B.1.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Fix k ≥ 1. Let C denote the cost function corresponding to a facility location
instance in which k players are co-located with a facility that has opening cost 1. Thus C(∅) = 0 and
C(S) = 1 if S 6= ∅. Let χ be a β-budget-balanced, cross-monotone cost-sharing method for C .
Let σ denote a random permutation of the players. We can complete the proof by showing that the
expected value of the left-hand side of (1) is at least Hk/β. For ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let Xℓ denote the random
variable equal to χ(iℓ, Sℓ), where Sℓ and iℓ denote the set of the first ℓ players and the ℓth player with respect
to σ, respectively. Fix ℓ and condition on the set Sℓ. Since χ is β-budget-balanced and every player of Sℓ
is equally likely to be last, the conditional expectation of Xℓ is at least 1/βℓ. Since this inequality holds
independently of the value of Sℓ, E [Xℓ] ≥ 1/βℓ. Summing over ℓ and applying linearity of expectation
completes the proof. 
B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Before proving Lemma 3.5, we review the Pa´l-Tardos cost-sharing methods for facility location prob-
lems [21]. Given a facility location instance defined by players U , facilities F with opening costs f , and a
metric c on U ∪ F , the corresponding PT cost-sharing method χPT is defined as follows. Fix an arbitrary
subset S ⊆ U of players. First, there is a notion of time, which is initially 0 and increases at a uniform rate.
At a time t ≥ 0, we associate with each player i ∈ S a ball of radius t with center j, where distances are
with respect to the given metric c. Once a ball includes a facility q ∈ F , the subsequent growth of this ball
contributes toward “filling” this facility. Once these contributions equal the facility’s opening cost fq, we
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declare the facility q to be full. Precisely, facility q becomes full at the time tq defined by the equation
∑
i∈S
max{0, tq − c(q, i)} = fq. (3)
The PT cost share χPT (i, S) of a player i in S is then defined as the length of time during which there
is no full facility in player i’s ball. These cost-shares and known to be both 3-budget-balanced and cross-
monotone [21].
Next, we establish that increasing distances can only increase PT cost shares.
Lemma B.1 Let I and I ′ denote two instances of uncapacitated facility location with the same player set
U , facility sets F , and facility opening costs f . Assume that the metric c′ on U ∪ F of the second instance
dominates the first, in that c′(i, j) ≥ c(i, j) for every i, j ∈ U ∪F . Let χPT and χ′PT be the PT cost-sharing
methods corresponding to I and I ′, respectively. Then χ′PT (i, S) ≥ χPT (i, S) for every set S ⊆ U and
player i ∈ S.
Proof: Fix a set S ⊆ U . First, equation (3) immediately implies facilities can only become full later in the
instance I ′ than in I . Second, note that the PT cost share of a player i ∈ S is defined as the earliest time at
which a full facility lies in player i’s ball. It follows that PT cost shares for I ′ can only be larger than those
for I . 
Proof of Lemma 3.5: Fix an arbitrary facility location instance I0, given by a player set U , a facility set
F , facility opening costs f , and a metric c0 on U ∪ F . Let C0 denote the corresponding facility location
cost function, χ0PT the corresponding PT cost-sharing method, and α the smallest number such that χ0PT is
α-summable for C0. We aim to exhibit a single-facility instance such that the corresponding PT cost-sharing
method is no better than α-summable.
Choose an ordering σ of the players of U and a set S ⊆ U such that ∑|S|ℓ=1 χ0PT (iℓ, Sℓ) = α · C0(S),
where Sℓ and iℓ denote the set of the first ℓ players and the ℓth player of S in the ordering σ, respectively.
Fix an optimal solution to the facility location instance induced by the players in S. Let F ∗ denote the
facilities opened by this solution, and let Sq denote the players of S assigned to the facility q ∈ F ∗ in this
solution. This solution has cost
C0(S) =
∑
q∈F ∗

fq +∑
i∈Sq
c0(i, q)

 .
We obtain the instance I1 from I0 by modifying distances as follows. If a player i ∈ S is assigned to
the facility q ∈ F ∗ in the fixed optimal solution to the instance induced by S, then set c1(i, q) = c0(i, q). All
other distances between players and facilities are set to a sufficiently large number. Other distances, which
will not play a role in what follows, can be set as large as possible subject to the Triangle Inequality. Let
C1 denote the cost function corresponding to I1 and χ1PT the corresponding PT cost-sharing method. By
construction, C1(S) = C0(S). Lemma B.1 implies that
|S|∑
ℓ=1
χ1PT (iℓ, Sℓ) ≥ α · C1(S), (4)
where Sℓ and iℓ denote the first ℓ players and the ℓth player of S with respect to σ. Thus χ1PT is no better
than α-summable for C1.
The instance I1 is essentially a collection of independent single-facility instances. To make this precise,
for a facility q ∈ F ∗, let Iq denote the facility location instance with player set Sq, facility set {q}, opening
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cost fq, and with distances inherited from I1. Let Cq and χqPT denote the corresponding cost function and
PT cost-sharing method, respectively. By construction, we have
C1(S) =
∑
q∈F ∗
Cq(Sq). (5)
Further, our definition of the distances in I1 ensures that the PT cost share χ1(iℓ, Sℓ) for a player iℓ ∈ Sq
is a function only of the set of other players of Sq that precede iℓ in the ordering σ. (Only players of Sq
contribute to the filling of facility q.) Because of this, we have
|S|∑
ℓ=1
χ1PT (iℓ, Sℓ) =
∑
q∈F ∗
|Sq|∑
p=1
χqPT (ip, S
q
p), (6)
where Sqp and ip denote the first p players and the pth player of Sq, respectively, according to σ. Inequality (4)
and equations (5) and (6) imply that for some q ∈ F ∗,
|Sq|∑
p=1
χqPT (ip, S
q
p) ≥ α · Cq(Sq).
The PT cost shares χq are therefore no better than α-summable for the single-facility instance Iq, and the
proof is complete. 
B.1.3 Proof of Lemma 3.6
Proof of Lemma 3.6: Consider an arbitrary facility location problem with a single facility q and a set U of
k players. Let fq denote the opening cost for q and c(j, q) denote the distance between the player j and the
facility q. For a set S of players, let c(S, q) denote the sum of the distances of the demands in the set S to
the facility q: c(S, q) =
∑
i∈S c(i, q). Because there is only one facility, we have C(S) = fq + c(S, q) for
every S ⊆ U . Let χPT denote the PT cost-sharing method.
Fix an arbitrary ordering σ of the players in U and a subset S ⊆ U . Let Sℓ be the first ℓ players of S in
the ordering and iℓ the ℓth player. By Definition 2.3, we need to show that
|S|∑
ℓ=1
χPT (iℓ, Sℓ) ≤ Hk · C(S). (7)
Fix ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |S|} and consider the set Sℓ of players. Recall from the definition of PT cost shares
that there is a time t at which the facility q becomes full. There are two cases. If c(iℓ, q) > t, then the PT
cost share χ(iℓ, Sℓ) equals c(iℓ, q)—by the time q lies in player iℓ’s ball, it is already full. If c(iℓ, q) ≤ t,
then the PT cost share χPT (iℓ, Sℓ) is t—by the time facility q is full, it already lies in player iℓ’s ball.
In the latter case, the growth of player iℓ’s ball contributes toward filling the facility q during the time
interval [c(iℓ, q), t]. Since q is the only facility and it is not full during this time, the cost shares of all of the
players in Sℓ are accumulating during this time. All but c(i, q) of the increase in the cost share of a player
i ∈ Sℓ−1 during this time must contribute toward the filling of facility q. Thus,
[t− c(iℓ, q)] +
∑
i∈Sℓ−1
[t− c(iℓ, q)− c(i, q)] ≤ fq.
Rewriting,
t− c(iℓ, q) ≤ 1
ℓ

fq + ∑
i∈Sℓ−1
c(i, q)

 .
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We can therefore bound the PT cost share χPT (iℓ, Sℓ) of player iℓ by
χPT (iℓ, Sℓ) ≤ c(iℓ, q) + 1
ℓ

fq + ∑
i∈Sℓ−1
c(i, q)

 .
Summing over all ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |S|} then gives
|S|∑
ℓ=1
χPT (iℓ, Sℓ) ≤
|S|∑
ℓ=1

c(iℓ, q) + 1
ℓ

fq + ∑
i∈Sℓ−1
c(i, q)




= fq
|S|∑
ℓ=1
1
ℓ
+
|S|∑
ℓ=1
c(iℓ, q) ·

1 +
|S|∑
p=ℓ+1
1
p


≤ Hk ·

fq +
|S|∑
ℓ=1
c(iℓ, q)


= Hk · C(S),
completing the proof of (7). 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.7
To prepare for the proof of Theorem 3.7, we recapitulate the GST cost-sharing method of [9, 17]. Fix an
SSRoB cost function C , defined implicitly via the graph G = (V,E) with edge costs c and root vertex t, the
parameter M ≥ 1, and the player set U . Fix a set S ⊆ U and choose a random subset D ⊆ S be adding each
player i ∈ S to D independently with probability 1/M . Condition on the set D. The conditional cost share
of a player i /∈ D is defined as the shortest-path distance between i and a player in D∪{t}. The conditional
cost share of a player i ∈ D is defined as M times the Jain-Vazirani cost share χJV (i,D) of i with respect
to the Steiner tree instance defined by G, c, t, and the players D (see [11] and Section 4 for details). The
GST cost share χGST (i, S) of player i ∈ S is then defined as the expected value of its conditional cost
shares, where the expectation is over the random choice of the subset D. These cost shares are known to be
4-budget-balanced and cross-monotonic [9, 17].
Next, note that a GST cost share χGST (i, S) can be naturally decomposed into the sum of two terms: a
term χbuy(i, S) that corresponds to choices of the subset D that include i, and a term χrent(i, S) correspond-
ing to subsets D that exclude i. Mirroring several recent analyses of sampling algorithms for rent-or-buy
problems [7, 6, 8], our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we directly upper bound the summability of
χbuy. Second, show that the summability of χrent is at most a constant factor times that of χbuy .
We first show that for every SSRoB cost function, the corresponding cost-sharing method χbuy is
O(log2 k)-summable.
Lemma B.2 Let C be a k-player SSRoB cost function and χbuy the first term of the corresponding GST
cost-sharing method. Then χbuy is O(log2 k)-summable for C .
Proof: Fix an ordering σ of U and a set S ⊆ U of players. Condition on the random choice of the set
D ⊆ S. Since JV cost shares are O(log2 k)-summable for all Steiner tree cost functions [23], the sum of the
conditional cost shares of players in D is O(M log2 k) times the cost of an optimal Steiner tree spanning
D ∪ {t}:
|D|∑
ℓ=1
χJV (iℓ,Dℓ) ≤ O(log2 k) ·M ·OPTD,
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where OPTD denotes the cost of an optimal Steiner tree spanning D ∪ {t}, and Dℓ and iℓ denote the set of
the first ℓ players and the ℓth player, respectively, of the set D according to σ.
A result of Gupta, Kumar, and Roughgarden [7, Lemma 2.2], based on earlier work by Karger and
Minkoff [13], implies that M times the expectation (over D) of OPTD is at most the cost C(S) of an
optimal SSRoB solution. Thus
ED

 |D|∑
ℓ=1
χJV (iℓ,Dℓ)

 ≤ O(log2 k) · C(S). (8)
For a player i ∈ S, let Xi denote the random variable equal to 0 when i /∈ D, and equal to the term
χJV (iℓ,Dℓ) that corresponds to player i when i ∈ D. Note that ED[Xi] = χbuy(i, Si), where Si is the
set of players of S equal to or preceding player i in the ordering σ. Applying linearity of expectation to the
left-hand side of (8) then completes the proof. 
Next we show that the summability of the second term χrent of the GST cost-sharing method is at most
a constant factor times that of the first. To prove this, we make use of the following simple fact about the JV
Steiner tree cost-sharing method.
Fact B.3 Let C be the Steiner tree cost function defined by the graph G = (V,E) with edge costs c, root
vertex t, and player set U . Let χJV be the corresponding JV cost-sharing method. Then for every subset
S ⊆ U and player i ∈ S, the JV cost share χJV (i, S) of i is at least half of the shortest-path distance
between i and some other player in S ∪ {t}.
We now bound the summability of the χrent term of the GST cost-sharing method, which will complete
the proof of Theorem 3.7.
Lemma B.4 Let C be a k-player SSRoB cost function and χrent the first term of the corresponding GST
cost-sharing method. Then χrent is O(log2 k)-summable for C .
Proof: Fix an ordering σ of U , a set S ⊆ U of players, and a player iℓ ∈ S that is ℓth in the ordering σ. Let
Sℓ denote the players of S that equal or precede i in the ordering σ. Recall that, after conditioning on the
random subset D ⊆ Sℓ of players, player iℓ’s conditional cost share contributes to χbuy(iℓ, Sℓ) if iℓ ∈ D
and to χrent(iℓ, Sℓ) if iℓ /∈ D.
For every player i preceding iℓ in the ordering σ, condition on whether or not i is included in the
random sample, and let D′ ⊆ Sℓ \ {iℓ} be the selected players. Player iℓ will be included in the set
D with probability 1/M , in which case its conditional cost share will be M · χJV (iℓ,D′ ∪ {iℓ}), where
χJV (iℓ,D
′ ∪ {iℓ}) is player iℓ’s JV cost share in the Steiner tree cost-sharing problem induced by the
players of D′∪{iℓ}. Player iℓ is excluded from the random sample D with probability (1−1/M), in which
case its conditional cost share equals the shortest distance d(iℓ,D′ ∪ {t}) between iℓ and either a player of
D′ or the root vertex t.
Let Rℓ denote the random variable equal to d(iℓ,D ∪ {t}) if iℓ /∈ D and equal to 0 otherwise. Let Bℓ
denote the random variable equal to M · χJV (iℓ,D) if iℓ ∈ D and equal to 0 otherwise. We then have
χrent(iℓ, Sℓ) = ED [Rℓ]
= Pr [i /∈ D] · ED′
[
d(iℓ,D
′ ∪ {t})]
≤ 2 · ED′
[
χJV (iℓ,D
′ ∪ {iℓ}
]
= 2 ·Pr [i ∈ D] ·ED′
[
M · χJV (iℓ,D′ ∪ {iℓ}
]
= 2 · ED [Bℓ]
= 2 · χbuy(iℓ, Sℓ),
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where the inequality follows from Fact B.3. Summing over all players iℓ ∈ S and applying Lemma B.2
completes the proof. 
C Missing Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Lemma 4.5: Fix an iteration j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, an ordering of the active edges of Gj−1, and an edge
(v,w) in this ordering. Let A1, . . . , Am denote the m groups of
√
k co-located players of Uj corresponding
to the edge (v,w). Let Sˆ denote the players already included in S in previous and the present iteration. Let
X1 denote the union A1 ∪ · · · ∪Am.
We claim that for m sufficiently large, at least m/2β of the groups A1, . . . , Am satisfy
∑
i∈Ar
χ(i, Sˆ ∪X1) ≥ 2
−j
4β
. (9)
We say that such groups survive. Every surviving group must contain a player i for which χ(i, Sˆ ∪X1) ≥
2−j/4β
√
k.
To prove the claim, label the surviving groups A11, . . . , A1q . Let Y1 denote their union A11 ∪ · · · ∪A1q . By
Lemma 4.4, we have C(Sˆ) = 1—in words, there is a subgraph H of G that spans all of the players of Sˆ and
that has total cost 1. Since (v,w) is active, the vertices v and w are both spanned by H . Since each group
A11, . . . , A
1
q is connected to both v and w by edges of cost 2−j , C(Sˆ ∪Y1) ≤ 1+ q2−j . Indeed, the structure
of G ensures that this inequality holds with equality. We then have
∑
i∈Sˆ∪Y1
χ(i, Sˆ ∪X1) ≤
∑
i∈Sˆ∪Y1
χ(i, Sˆ ∪ Y1)
≤ C(Sˆ ∪ Y1)
= 1 + q2−j, (10)
where the first and second inequalities follows from the cross-monotonicity and approximate budget-balance
of χ, respectively.
Since (9) fails for non-surviving groups, and there at most m such groups, we have
∑
i∈X1\Y1
χ(i, Sˆ ∪X1) ≤ m2
−j
4β
. (11)
Combining (10) and (11) then gives
∑
i∈Sˆ∪X1
χ(i, Sˆ ∪X1) ≤ 1 + 2−j
(
q +
m
4β
)
. (12)
On the other hand, C(Sˆ ∪X1) = 1 +m2−j as noted above. Since χ is β-budget-balanced, we have
∑
i∈Sˆ∪X1
χ(i, Sˆ ∪X1) ≥ 1
β
(
1 +m2−j
)
. (13)
Combining (12) and (13) and rearranging gives the constraint
q ≥ 3
4β
m− 2j
(
1− 1
β
)
≥ 3
4β
m−
√
k
(
1− 1
β
)
.
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Thus q ≥ m/2β provided m is a sufficiently large function of k and β, as claimed.
We have thus identified q ≥ m/2β surviving groups A11, . . . , A2q , each of which contains a player i for
which χ(i, Sˆ ∪X1) ≥ 2−j/4β
√
k. We next repeat this process. More precisely, for each r ∈ {1, . . . , q},
obtain A2r from the surviving group A1r by removing an arbitrary player i with χ(i, Sˆ ∪X1) ≥ 2−j/4β
√
k.
Let X2 denote the union A21 ∪ · · · ∪ A2q . The above argument implies that, as long as q ≥ m/2β is a
sufficiently large function of k and β, then at least q/2β of the sets A21, . . . , A2q survive by satisfying an
analogue of inequality (9), with the sets X1 and Ar replaced by X2 and A2r , respectively.
Choose m ≥ 8β√k · (2β)
√
k
. Iterating this procedure and reindexing the surviving groups after each
iteration, we inductively obtain a collection of disjoint sets Ah1 , . . . , Ahqh for each h ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
√
k} with
the following properties:
(1) qh ≥ m/(2β)h;
(2) for each r ∈ {1, . . . , qh}, Ahr contains a player ihr such that χ(ihr , Sˆ ∪Xh) ≥ 2−j/4β(
√
k − h + 1),
where Xh = ∪rAhr ;
(3) for each r ∈ {1, . . . , qh} and h > 1, Ahr = Ah−1r \ {ih−1}.
By (1) and our choice of m, q√k ≥ 1. By properties (2) and (3) and cross-monotonicity of χ, the group A11
that corresponds to A
√
k
1 is good in the sense of (2). The proof is complete. 
D Missing Proofs from Section 5
D.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Fix an instance of the Set-Cover Game I ≡ {U, T, c}. Fix a vector v of valuations. Let S denote the set
serviced by DMV when players bid truthfully. Let C ′(S) denote the cost that DMV incurs in servicing S.
Let O∗ be the set of players which minimizes social cost.
We need to show that:
C ′(S) + V (U \ S) ≤ (Hk + 1)(C(O∗) + V (U \O∗))
We start by bounding C ′(S):
Lemma D.1 C ′(S) ≤ Hk · (C(O∗) + V (S \O∗))
Proof: First note that 1HkC ′(S) is completely paid for by the members of S.
∑
i∈S
χDMV (i, S) ≥ 1
Hk
C ′(S)
∑
i∈O∗∩S
χDMV (i, S) +
∑
i∈S\O∗
χDMV (i, S) ≥ 1
Hk
C ′(S).
Since the cost-shares are in the core the first term on the left hand side of the above inequality can be bounded
above by C(O∗ ∩ S), which is at most C(O∗ ∩ S) as the cost function C is increasing. Since players bid
truthfully and DMV satisfies VP and NPT , the second term on the left hand side of the above inequality can
be bounded by V (S \O∗). The lemma follows. 
Next we bound V (O∗ \ S):
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Lemma D.2 V (O∗ \ S) ≤ C(O∗)
Proof: Let σ denote the order in which players in O∗ \ S were deleted by DMV. Let l denote the size of
O∗ \ S. When player σi is deleted by DMV, it is offered a price at most C(O
∗)
(l−i+1)Hk . Also, since players are
bidding truthfully the valuation vσi is less than the price offered at deletion. Summing over all the players
in O∗ \ S gives V (O∗ \ S) ≤ HlHkC(O∗). Since k ≥ l, we have the lemma. 
The theorem follows easily from the lemmas.
D.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2
Fix an instance of the facility location problem I ≡ {F,D, c}. We start by giving a brief description of the
DMV facility location mechanism. First, the mechanism accepts bids. The description of the mechanism
involves the notion of time. At time t = 0, all cost shares are initialized to 0. The mechanism then raises
the cost shares at a uniform rate. At any time instant t in the process, a demand which is unconnected
and still under consideration pays an amount max(0, t − cij) toward the opening cost of any unopened
facility j. During the course of execution three types of events arise. First, the cost share of a player may
exceed its bid. In this case the player is deleted and removed from further consideration. Second, cost shares
contributed toward an unopened facility may equal its opening cost. In this case, the facility is declared open
and all unconnected demands which make non zero contributions toward the opening cost are connected to
the facility. The demands are charged their current cost share. Third, the cost share of an unconnected
demand may equal its connection cost to some opened facility. In this case, the demand is connected to the
facility and is charged its current cost share. In the latter cases, when a demand is connected to a facility, its
contributions toward the opening cost of other facilities is withdrawn. Likewise, when a demand is deleted,
all of its contributions toward facility opening costs are withdrawn. The mechanism terminates when all the
demands are either serviced or deleted. To ensure that the cost shares are in the core, all the costs (connection
and facility opening costs) are initially scaled by a factor 1.861. We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.2.
Fix a vector v of valuations. Let S denote the set serviced by DMV when players bid truthfully. Let
C ′(S) denote the cost that DMV incurs in servicing S. Let O∗ be the set of players which minimizes social
cost.
We need to show that:
C ′(S) + V (U \ S) ≤ ( Hk
1.861
+ 1.861)(C(O∗) + V (U \O∗))
We start by bounding C ′(S):
Lemma D.3 C ′(S) ≤ 1.861 · (C(O∗) + V (S \O∗))
Proof: First note that 11.861C ′(S) is completely paid for by the members of S.
∑
i∈S
χDMV (i, S) ≥ 1
1.861
C ′(S)
∑
i∈O∗∩S
χDMV (i, S) +
∑
i∈S\O∗
χDMV (i, S) ≥ 1
1.861
C ′(S).
Since the cost-shares are in the core the first summand on the left hand side of the above inequality can be
bounded above by C(O∗ ∩ S), which is at most C(O∗ ∩ S) as the cost function C is increasing. Since
players bid truthfully and DMV satisfies VP and NPT , the second summand on the left hand side of the
above inequality can be bounded by V (S \O∗). The lemma follows. 
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Next we bound V (O∗ \S). Let σ denote the order in which players in O∗ \S were deleted by DMV. Let
σi denote the ith player in the ordering. Let xDMV (j) denote the price offered by DMV when the player j
was deleted.
Let O an allocation that optimizes social cost. The optimal solution O consists of a set of stars, each
with a facility and many demands connected to it. Each demand belongs to a specific star. For any player σi
deleted by DMV, let Oσi denote the set of players from the same star in the optimal solution, which belong
to O∗ \ S) and are after σi in the ordering σ. By the correctness of the DMV algorithm we have that:
Fact D.4 The valuations of players in Oσi ∪ {σi} must be at least xDMV (σi)− ǫ for any ǫ > 0.
Let fσi denote the facility in the star to which σi belongs. Consider a run of greedy algorithm on the
set of demands Oσi ∪ {σi} with facility fσi , with the opening costs and the metric being scaled down by a
factor 1.861. Let xOPT (σi) denote the time at which the player σi is served. Then:
Lemma D.5 xDMV (σi) ≤ xOPT (σi)
Proof: Proof sketch. Assume this is not true: xDMV (σi) > xOPT (σi).
In the run on the star, by time xOPT (σi), the facility fσi must be full and the demand σi should touch
it. Since all the players in Oσi ∪ {σi} are also present in the run of DMV at time xDMV (σi), they were also
present at time xOPT (σi). So, at this time, the facility fσi would have filled up and σi would touch it. By
Fact D.4, it should have been serviced. This is a contradiction. 
Fact D.6 On single facility instances, the cost-shares offered by the Pal-Tardos are identical to the those
offered by the greedy algorithm.
Lemma D.7 V (O∗ \ S) ≤ Hk1.861C(O∗)
Proof: Since players are bidding truthfully the valuation vσi < xDMV (σi). By Lemma D.5, vσi <
xOPT (σi). By Fact D.6 and Lemma 3.6, summing over all the players in O∗ \ S gives V (O∗ \ S) ≤
Hk
1.861 · C(O∗). 
The theorem follows easily from the lemmas.
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